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Lest We Forget: DM-357 TCG Muavenet


On 2nd October 1992, 11 minutes past midnight, during the NATO’s Display Determination ’92 naval exercise, two Sea Sparrow surface to air missiles fired accidentally from the aircraft carrier CV-60 USS Saratoga, hit the bridge of the Turkish destroyer DM-357 TCG Muavenet. 5 sailors including the commander of the ship were killed instantly and 15 badly hurt. A fire broke out on board. At the time of the incident two ships were 3 miles apart and were streaming north in the Aegean.

One of the missiles hit the ship approximately after a flight of ten seconds. The first missile hit the front of the ships bridge and destroyed it. The second missile exploded in the air probably because the blast of the first missile and peppered the ship with shrapnel. Ships radar antenna, forward gun turrets, hedgehog launcher suffered from the shrapnel damage. The pieces of the second missile penetrated the forward gun turret, cabins of the supply officer and XO.

A fire started at the ammunition chamber of the Hedgehog system. The explosion of the Hedgehog rounds would have caused the loss of the ships. After the hits general quarters were sounded and the fire fighting teams started to tackle the fire. On the other hand the damage control teams were throwing the ready ammunition in the forward gun turrets and other explosives near the fire over the board as a safety measure.

The fire was under control in 10 minutes but the water caused damage in the decks that were not harmed in the initial blast.

The extend of the damage resulting both from missile impact and fire is obvious. It was quite a skill to bring the fire under control before reached to the gun turret in B position. If the fire has spread further to the turrets and ammunition chambers of the guns, the she would not have survived.

All the fire fighting and damage control efforts were done in the absence of the commander of the ship. This fact speaks for the professionalism of the officers and the bravery of the whole crew.

They simply did not give up the ship.

Commander Kudret Güngör
Ensign Alertunga Akan
Petty Officer 3th Class Serkan Aktepe
Sergant Mustafa Kılınç
Private Recep Akan

Paid the ultimate price for the defence of their country.

 

For further reading:
US Navy Court of Inquiry

Turkish Navy Court of Inquiry

Wikipedia

An interesting but technical legal article about why USA did not paid indemnities to the Turkish sailors

 

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Lest We Forget: DM-357 TCG Muavenet

I have missed the anniversary of the incident of TCG Muavenet being hit. So I am reposting one of my earlier post about this incident:

DM-357 TCG Muavenet was a special ship for me. This picture of hers, which I have taken back in 29 October 1989, was my very first photo to be published in Jane’s Fighting Ships in 1991 edition.

On 2th October 1992, 11 minutes past midnight, during the NATO’s Display Determination ’92 naval exercise, two Sea Sparrow surface to air missiles fired accidentally from the aircraft carrier CV-60 USS Saratoga, hit the bridge of the Turkish destroyer DM-357 TCG Muavenet. 5 sailors including the commander of the ship were killed instantly and 15 badly hurt. A fire broke out on board. At the time of the incident two ships were 3 miles apart and were streaming north in the Aegean.

According the United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit the fateful events unfolded as follows:

“On October 1, 1992, the Combat Direction Center Officer aboard the Saratoga decided to launch a simulated attack on nearby opposition forces utilizing the Sea Sparrow missile system. After securing the approval of the Saratoga’s Commanding Officer and the Battle Group Commander, the Combat Direction Center Officer implemented the simulated assault plan. Without providing prior notice, officers on the Saratoga woke the enlisted Sea Sparrow missile team and directed them to conduct the simulated attack.

Certain members of the missile firing team were not told that the exercise was a drill, rather than an actual event. As the drill progressed, the missile system operator used language to indicate he was preparing to fire a live missile, but due to the absence of standard terminology, the responsible officers failed to appreciate the significance of the terms used and the requests made. Specifically, the Target Acquisition System operator issued the command “arm and tune,” terminology the console operators understood to require arming of the missiles in preparation for actual firing.

The officers supervising the drill did not realize that “arm and tune” signified a live firing. As a result, the Saratoga inadvertently fired two live Sea Sparrow missiles at the TCG Muavenet. Both missiles struck the TCG Muavenet, resulting in several deaths and numerous injuries.”

According to a report prepared by Turkish Naval Military Prosecutor’s Office on November 11, 1992 the Saratoga was with the visible horizon and the launch of the missiles were observed on TCG Muavenet.

One of the missiles hit the ship approximately after a flight of ten seconds. The first missile hit the front of the ships bridge and destroyed it. The second missile exploded in the air probably because the blast of the first missile and peppered the ship with shrapnel. Ships radar antenna, forward gun turrets, hedgehog launcher suffered from the shrapnel damage. The pieces of the second missile penetrated the forward gun turret, cabins of the supply officer and XO.

A fire started at the ammunition chamber of the Hedgehog system. The explosion of the Hedgehog rounds would have caused the loss of the ships. After the hits general quarters were sounded and the fire fighting teams started to tackle the fire. On the other hand the damage control teams were throwing the ready ammunition in the forward gun turrets and other explosives near the fire over the board as a safety measure.

When the situation was under control TCG Muavenet was towed to the Gölcük Naval Base. And the exercise continued as planned.

The damage to the old ship was extensive. She was not useable anymore therefore she was decommissioned right away. Later US gave Knox class FFG-1093 USS Capodanno as compensation.

The fire was under control in 10 minutes but the water caused damage in the decks that were not harmed in the initial blast.

These two photos were taken after TGC Muavenet was towed to Gölcük Naval Base.

The extend of the damage resulting both from missile impact and fire is obvious. It was quite a skill to bring the fire under control before reached to the gun turret in B position. If the fire has spread further to the turrets and ammunition chambers of the guns, the she would not have survived.

All the fire fighting and damage control efforts were done in the absence of the commander of the ship. This fact speaks for the professionalism of the officers and the bravery of the whole crew. They simply did not give up the ship.

Commander Kudret Güngör
Ensign Alertunga Akan
Petty Officer 3th Class Serkan Aktepe
Sergant Mustafa Kılınç
Private Recep Akan

Paid the ultimate price for the defence of their country.

For further reading:
US Navy Court of Inquiry

Turkish Navy Court of Inquiry

Wikipedia

An interesting but technical legal article about why USA did not paid indemnities to the Turkish sailors

The Last Voyage Of TCG Muavenet

The Knox class ex-Muavenet on her way to the scrapyard in Aliağa. She is towed by A-587 TCG Gazal. Photo: Turgay Köken, used with permission.

The bulk of the FF-1093 ex-USS Capodanno, F-250 ex-TCG Muavenet is on her way to the scrapyard in Aliağa, İzmir. This is her final voyage.

The Knox class frigates served a short service in Turkish Navy compared to older Gearing class destroyers and newer Perry class frigates. F-250 TCG Muavenet was the first ever Knox class ship given by the US Navy to the Turkish Navy. She was given as a compensation to the old DM-357 TCG Muavenet, which was severely damaged by two Sea Sparrow anti aircraft missiles fired accidentally from the aircraft carrier USS Saratoga in 1992.

The hull of ex-TCG Muavenet. Photo: Turgay Köken, used with permission.

 

>Lest We Forget: DM-357 TCG Muavenet

>

DM-357 TCG Muavenet

On 2nd October, 18 years ago Turkish Navy experienced one of its worst friendly fire incidents.

On 2nd October 1992, 11 minutes past midnight, during the NATO’s Display Determination ’92 naval exercise, two Sea Sparrow surface to air missiles fired accidentally from the aircraft carrier CV-60 USS Saratoga, hit the bridge of the Turkish destroyer DM-357 TCG Muavenet.

Five on the bridge were immediately killed including the commander of the ship. The fire caused by the impacts was taken out before it ignited the ammunition of the B turret or the Hedgehog ASW system just aft of the turret.

The stricken ship was able to reach Çanakkale under her own power, later she was towed to Gölcük Naval Base.

DM-357 TCG Muavenet was a special ship for me. This picture of hers, which I have taken back in 29 October 1989, was my very first photo to be published in Jane’s Fighting Ships in 1991 edition.

To commemorate the accidents anniversary, I have asked a couple fellow bloggers who where in US Navy at that, about their personal experiences following the incident. Xformed from the Blog Chaotic Synaptic Activity was kind enough to share his experience about the aftermath of this incident on US Navy.

The rest of this post is from xformed.

On Oct 2nd, 1992, the day of the USS SARATOGA (CV60)/TCG MAUVENET (DM57) incident, I had been at my job for 2 1/2 years. I was assigned as the Combat Systems Assessment (CSA) Officer for Commander, Naval Surface Forces, Atlantic (CNSL), but we were in the process of reorganizing into the Afloat Training Group (ATG) command, as the combat Systems Training Group (CSTG). My specific duties included the management of the process by which surface ships (this being a US Navy distinction, where aircraft carriers, and submarine tenders were not considered “surface ships” organizationally, as they “belonged” to the aviation or submarine Type Commanders respectively). I had played a significant role in redefining the inspection process, making it less of a material and safety look, and more of an operational/functional look, which put not just the crew’s capabilities in the spot light, but also how the chain of command handled internal training in combat systems/operations. My interaction with the events of that day did not being until Feb of 93. Background:


As the Department Head for the CSA shop, I most regularly was aboard two ships a week, in the Atlantic Fleet area (from Newport, RI, to Mayport, FL), but we were based out of Naval Amphibious Base (NAB) Little Creek, VA. My team, comprised of my own departmental personnel, and augmented by subject matters experts from the warfare training departments, was nominally about 12 – 15 enlisted, and one other officer as my assistant.


The CSA Inspection had been formally modified the prior August to have use first inspect the watchbills of the ship, followed by validating the proper qualifications in selected watchstander’s service records. We provided the same look at the ship’s combat Systems Training Team (CSTT), ensuring they had been properly training and qualified to train their shipmates. We also looked at key administrative programs and operational documents. I normally would check the ship’s use of the Personnel Qualification Systems (PQS), and LT Wycoff would inspect the use of the Explosives Handling Program/Qualification Certification Program (EHPQCP), which was put in place as the result of the fires aboard the USS FORESTAL (CV-59) and USS ENTERPRISE (CVN-65) off of Vietnam many years before. PQS had grown out of the Vietnam era as well, beginning in the Engineering world to standardize training and qualification methods aboard ship. As the impetus to create both of those programs were founded as a result of major fires aboard carriers, and many deadly engineering casualties, we treated them as foundational programs, necessary to safe and effective combat operations. My other team members reviewed many other programs and all of us would walk the major combat systems equipment and operational spaces, checking for safety issues.


Once completed, we would then (usually after lunch) begin the practical portion of the inspection, with the ship’s CSTT briefing the exercises they had planned for the watch teams. In addition to basic assignments of the CSTT members, they were required to specifically list what actions by the watchstanders would be simulated, and how they would be simulated. In addition, what safety considerations/procedures would be put in place during the exercise to make sure accidents didn’t occur, and everyone was fully aware of what would happen live, and what would be approved to “have been carried out.” While our goal was to ensure the ship’s operated well as individual units (my team’s charter), we took our mission seriously in regards to safety. Thankfully, across three years of inspecting, it was a rare occasion where my team or I had to stop things for safety reasons. Our advantage was the years and depth of experience that went aboard each inspection with me, or another senior officer. We had seen things, been trained in things, and brought that view to all we did. While we did not represent the captain’s CSTT, we were there to pass along how it was done, so the ship’s company would be able to operate as my team did.


Beyond safety, the myriad of other procedures used were apart of our daily emphasis: Combat Systems Doctrine, operational watchstanding and communications, Battle Orders, and Rules of Engagement (ROE), and the technical capabilities of the weapons and sensors used in combat operations.


Now, to catch up to my involvement. In early February 1993, CAPT Phil Balisle stepping into my office and told me I had been assigned to visit every Atlantic Fleet ship that had NATO Sea Sparrow installed, and to validate the crew’s understanding of the safe and effective operation of the equipment in a tactical scenario. Assigned to me were LCDR Don Diehl, presently attached to USS GEORGE WASHINGTON as the CDC Officer. FCCS(SW) Goss from Naval Guided Missile School, and FCC(SW) Dann of my office, CSTGLANT. FCCS Goss and FCC Dann were 1157 NSSMS technicians, which included the operator qualifications for using NSSMS.


I was put in touch with my counterpart from the Pacific Fleet, and within a few days, we had standardized the re-certification process. I pushed for and got, the conduct of a simulated engagement, run by the ship’s CSTT, to allow use to gauge the future capabilities of crews to properly maintain training and readiness.


Other included checks would be the qualifications of the watchstanders and the CSTT members, safety checks on the equipment, review of the EHPQCP records for completeness, and oral exams of the watchstanaders.


This was done, by my team, on all ships in the Atlantic Fleet, this time to include aircraft carriers. we ended up inspecting and certifying all of the units, with only one, the USS SEATTLE (AOE3), needing a reinspection, based on the records of qualifications not being properly documented. That earned the team a second visit to Naval Weapons Station Earle, NJ.


While not every inspection was perfect, the results of single ship redo was good. The highlight, I recall was the USS MOOSBRUGGER (DD-980) under then CDR Mike Moe, who had been a shipmate of mine years before, but his team was well trained and exceptionally competent in their operations and qualifications.


During the conduct of the oral examinations, LCDR Diehl, who had been flown to Naples to provide subject matter expert testimony to the Court of Inquiry, heard the entire testimony. He indicated, as is shown in the formal JAGMAN of the incident, that a lack of understanding of a the terminology “arm and tune” seemed to be the point where communication broke down, and then to belief this was to be an actual firing worked it’s way into the series of orders and actions. He also indicated, not covered in the report, that the FOC and ROC operators had been rousted out of their racks, in a non-routine schedule, about 2345, and told to get up and man their equipment right now. The confusion of such a significant request, at an odd hour seemed to Don to not have helped any in the assessments each sailor was making that night, leading to the mis-communications.


COMNAVAIRLANT had not adopted a formal establishment of the CSTT concept, which had been a Surface type commander requirement (by formal instruction) for several years. Some carriers had them, to some degree or another, and a few did not formally use the concept.


Following all of this, COMNAVAIRLANT (and I’m sure COMNAVAIRPAC) added a formal instruction for the establishment and organization of CSTTs on their units. When this accident occurred, my first thoughts in 92 were “I wondered how the CSTT let that happen?” The implementation of the CSTTs, then on surface ships and later on the aviation ships, was a safety measure to help prevent such occurrences. The simulation of actually firing the weapons, given the time of day (0002 L) would have been briefed, and the crew would have been required to verbally describe how they would have placed the system in a firing state to several of the CSTT members (one in the NSSMS Equipment room, and at least one in CDC withe the TAS Operator and SWC and TAO).


While none of this provides consolation to those who lost family members, I spent the next four months, traveling all the way to Hurgada, Egypt in one case, to validate the Fleet’s understanding of this important issue of safely training and operating. Deployed ships were not spared from a visit from an inspection team, and only the USS O’BANNON (DD-987), then in overhaul, did not get visited by my team. If I recall, there was an action item for a visit from the CSTG when the ship became operational again.


The use of many training methods, well entrenched in the Surface Ship Community, and with mostly in the Aviation Navy, had been able to keep such accidents from happening all along, and certainly have helped in preventing them since. As with our own internal experience with the fatal fires aboard USS FORESTAL (CV-59), lives were lost, but it gave rise to a long standing qualification process of weapons handling, to reduce our chances of such occurrences again.

>Lest We Forget: DM-357 TCG Muavenet

>

I have missed the anniversary of the incident of TCG Muavenet being hit.

On 2th October 1992, 11 minutes past midnight, during the NATO’s Display Determination ’92 naval exercise, two Sea Sparrow surface to air missiles fired accidently from the aircraft carrier CV-60 USS Saratoga, hit the bridge of the Turkish destroyer DM-357 TCG Muavenet. 5 sailors including the commander of the ship were killed instantly and 15 badly hurt. A fire broke out on board. At the time of the incident two ships were 3 miles apart and were streaming north in the Aegean.

According the United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit the fatefull events unfolded as follows:

“On October 1, 1992, the Combat Direction Center Officer aboard the Saratoga decided to launch a simulated attack on nearby opposition forces utilizing the Sea Sparrow missile system. After securing the approval of the Saratoga’s Commanding Officer and the Battle Group Commander, the Combat Direction Center Officer implemented the simulated assault plan. Without providing prior notice, officers on the Saratoga woke the enlisted Sea Sparrow missile team and directed them to conduct the simulated attack.

Certain members of the missile firing team were not told that the exercise was a drill, rather than an actual event. As the drill progressed, the missile system operator used language to indicate he was preparing to fire a live missile, but due to the absence of standard terminology, the responsible officers failed to appreciate the significance of the terms used and the requests made. Specifically, the Target Acquisition System operator issued the command “arm and tune,” terminology the console operators understood to require arming of the missiles in preparation for actual firing.

The officers supervising the drill did not realize that “arm and tune” signified a live firing. As a result, the Saratoga inadvertently fired two live Sea Sparrow missiles at the TCG Muavenet. Both missiles struck the TCG Muavenet, resulting in several deaths and numerous injuries.”

According to a report prepared by Turkish Naval Military Prosecutor’s Office on November 11, 1992 the Saratoga was with the visible horizon and the launch of the missiles were observed on TCG Muavenet.

One of the missiles hit the ship approximately after a flight of ten seconds. The first missile hit the front of the ships bridge and destroyed it. The second missile exploded in the air probably because the blast of the first missile and peppered the ship with shrapnel. Ships radar antenna, forward gun turrets, hedgehog launcher suffered from the shrapnel damage. The pieces of the second missile penetrated the forward gun turret, cabins of the supply officer and XO.

A fire started at the ammunition chamber of the Hedgehog system. The explosion of the Hedgehog rounds would have caused the loss of the ships. After the hits general quarters were sounded and the fire fighting teams started to tackle the fire. On the other hand the damage control teams were throwing the ready ammunition in the forward gun turrets and other explosives near the fire over the board as a safety measure.

When the situation was under control TCG Muavenet was towed to the Gölcük Naval Base. And the exercise continued as planned.

The damage to the old ship was extensive. She was not useable anymore therefore she was decommissioned right away. Later US gave Knox class FFG-1093 USS Capodanno as compensation.

The fire was under control in 10 minutes but the water caused damage in the decks that were not harmed in the initial blast.

These two photos were taken after TGC Muavenet was towed to Gölcük Naval Base.

The extend of the damage resulting both from missile impact and fire is obvious. It was quite a skill to bring the fire under control before reached to the gun turret in B position. If the fire has spread further to the turrets and ammunition chambers of the guns, the she would not have survived.

All the fire fighting and damage control efforts were done in the absence of the commander of the ship. This fact speaks for the professionalism of the officers and the bravery of the whole crew. They simply did not give up the ship.

Commander Kudret Güngör
Ensign Alertunga Akan
Petty Officer 3th Class Serkan Aktepe
Sergant Mustafa Kılınç
Private Recep Akan

Paid the ultimate price for the defence of their country.

For further reading:
US Navy Court of Inquiry

Turkish Navy Court of Inquiry

Wikipedia

An interesting but technical legal article about why USA did not paid indemnities to the Turkish sailors

AKAR CLASS

NUMBER NAME COMMISSIONED
A-590 AKAR  9 September 1987
A-585 YARBAY KUDRET GÜNGÖR  24 October 1995

A595 A595-001

Characteristics:
Displacement: 19.500 tons full load
Dimensions: 145 x 22,8 x 8,4 meters
Speed, Range: 15 knots, 6000 miles at 14 kts.
Crew: 203

Weapons:
Guns: 2 x 40mm/70; 1 x Mk 15 Phalanx

Sensors:
Radars: Navigation

Comments:

TCG Akar carries 16.000 tons of fuel.

TCG Yarbay Kudret Güngör is the first Turkish Navy ship to be built in a private shipyard. She is named after the late commander of  DM-347 TCG Muavenet, who was killed, during the Display Determination naval exercise in 1992.

TCG Yarbay Kudret Güngör carries 9.980 tons fuel , 2.700 tons water and dry cargo.

An US Company Pays Compensation To The Family Of A Dead Turkish Admiral

This was an interesting news of an interesting development which could be turn into something big.

Family compensated after Turkish admiral dies of asbestos on US ship
A U.S. ship-building company has paid compensation to the family of a Turkish admiral who died of cancer after serving for years on a warship containing asbestos.

The Turkish admiral served on the warship Adatepe D 353, which was purchased from the United States in 1971, before he died of cancer, Güngör Karakuş of daily Habertürk reported today.

The admiral’s family, who asked to remain anonymous, sought legal compensation after they learned that the late officer contracted cancer due to the asbestos used in the U.S.-made ship. A court sentenced the company that built the ship to pay an undisclosed amount of money to the family to compensate for the admiral’s death.

The court’s ruling provided a precedent for the families of thousands of other Turkish sailors who have died of, or have suffered from, cancer to seek legal compensation from the company, lawyers Özge Haktan and Özlem Nur Öztürk said, as the Turkish Navy was known to possess a total of 25 warships built using asbestos that were all purchased from, or donated by, the U.S.

The first of the asbestos-laden warships were delivered to Turkey in 1949 as a donation from the U.S., the report said. Turkey continued to acquire ships that contained asbestos through donations and purchases in subsequent years.

Service members who worked on ships containing asbestos previously received compensation in the U.S., Italy and Greece, but the present case is the first time any Turk has received a payment.

As far as I know this is the first case of such compensation. In the Turkish version of this the sister lawyers stated that they were approached by their US colleagues during an international conference  about the possibility of collection compensations. I believe this could be a fallout of the class actions of US-based lawyers against asbestos and  the shipyards  that used this material.

I made a quick research about the destroyers transferred from US navy to Turkish Navy since the end of Second World War and about their constructors The two destroyers escorts TCG Berk and TCG Peyk were not transferred from US Navy. These ships were built in Turkey after the plans of US Navy Claude Jones class ships. It is highly possible that asbestos was used in their construction. This is why I have added them to the list.

All of the ships are long gone, a couple sunk as targets, a few turned into museums, rest scrapped. Of the 7 different shipyards that constructed the ships 4 are still in business.

Federal Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co: 6 ships transferred from USN were built by this yard. The yard and the company does not exist any more.

Gulf Shipbuilding: 1 destroyer, transferred was build here. The company does not exist any more.

Bath Iron Works: This company is still in business. One of the few shipyards able to produce large warships for the US Navy. 3 ships from this yard was in commission in Turkish Navy.

Bethlehem Steel Corporation: This is the shipyard that produced the ex  USS Forrest Royal ex TCG Adatepe and 7 other destroyers used by Turkish Navy. Although the name of the company that paid the compensation was not disclosed in the article it is clear that it was the Bethlehem Steel Company or its current owner.

Consolidated Steel Co: This company is still in business. They have built 4 destroyers used by Turkish navy.

Todd Pacific: This company is still in business and was bought by another. One destroyer used bu Turkish Navy was built by this shipyard.

Gölcük Naval Shipyard: This is the main shipyard of Turkish Navy and is specialized in submarine and frigate production. 2 Berk class ships based on US Claud Jones destroyer escort design, were built here.

I wonder if asbestos was only used in destroyers in US Navy. Turkish Navy received a wast variety of ships, submarines, destroyers, frigates, mine hunters, patrol boats, depot ships just to name a few. Did these ships had also asbestos and if yes aren’t the sailors worked in these vessels eligible to the same compensation?

Time will tell us if this case is going to be the first one of a many similar cases or just one time hit.

Below is a list of the all destroyers Turkish Navy received from US Navy and their service time in Turkish Navy.

Pennant Name Class Builder Commissioning Decommissioning Service
D340 İstanbul Fletcher Federal Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co 1967 1986 19
D341 İzmir Fletcher Gulf Shipbuilding 1967 1986 19
D342 İzmit Fletcher Bath Iron Works 1969 1980 11
D343 İskenderun Fletcher Bethlehem Steel Corporation 1969 1981 12
D344 İçel Fletcher Bethlehem Steel Corporation 1969 1981 12
D344 Gaziantep Gleaves Federal Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co 1950 1973 23
D345 Yücetepe Gearing Consolidated Steel Co 1974 1998 24
D345 Giresun Gleaves Federal Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co 1949 1973 24
D346 Alçıtepe Carpenter Bath Iron Works 1982 1997 15
D346 Gelibolu Gleaves Federal Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co 1949 1976 27
D347 Anıttepe Carpenter Consolidated Steel Co 1981 1997 16
D347 Gemlik Gleaves Federal Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co 1950 1974 24
D348 Savaştepe Gearing Consolidated Steel Co 1981 1994 13
D349 Kılıçalipaşa Gearing Consolidated Steel Co 1980 1998 18
D350 Piyalepaşa Gearing Bath Iron Works 1980 1999 19
D351 M Fevzi Çakmak Gearing Bethlehem Steel Corporation 1973 1994 21
D352 Gayret Gearing Todd Pacific 1973 1995 22
D353 Adatepe Gearing Bethlehem Steel Corporation 1971 1993 22
D354 Kocatepe Gearing Bethlehem Steel Corporation 1971 1974 3
D354 Kocatepe (II) Gearing Bethlehem Steel Corporation 1974 1993 19
D355 Tınaztepe Gearing Bethlehem Steel Corporation 1972 1984 12
D356 Zafer Allen M. Sumner Federal Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co 1972 1993 21
D358 Berk Berk Gölcük Naval Yard 1972 1999 27
D359 Peyk Berk Gölcük Naval Yard 1975 2001 26
DM357 Muavenet Robert H. Smith Bethlehem Steel Corporation 1971 1992 21

Auxiliaries

ÇEŞME CLASS

NUMBER NAME LAUNCHED COMMISSIONED
A-599 ÇEŞME (ex- Silas Bent T-AGS 26) 23 Jul 1965 8 June 2000
A-588 ÇANDARLI (ex- Kane T-AGS 27) 20 Nov 1965 25 July 2001

Characteristics:

Displacement: 2550 tons full load
Dimensions: 87 x 14.6 x 4.6 metres
Speed, Range: 15 knots, 12,000 miles at 14 kts.
Crew: 37 (12 officers)

Sensors:

Radars: RM 1650, navigation

Comments:

TCG ÇEŞME was transferred by US. Navy on 28 October 1999 in Singapur and TCG ÇANDARLI was transferred in March 2001. Designed specially for surveying operations.


ÇUBUKLU CLASS

NUMBER NAME LAUNCHED COMMISSIONED
A-594 ÇUBUKLU 17 Nov 1985 20 June 1986

Characteristics:

Displacement: 643 tons full load
Dimensions: 40.5 x 9.6 x 3.2 metres
Speed, Range: 11
Crew: 32 (5 officers)

Weapons:

Guns: 2 x 20mm

Sensors:

Radars: Navigation

Comments:

Built in Gölcük Naval Shipyard for surveying operations. Has integrated navigation and data processing system.


MESEHA CLASS

NUMBER NAME LAUNCHED COMMISSIONED
Y-35 MESEHA-1 1994 1994
Y-36 MESEHA-2 1994 1994

Characteristics:

Displacement: 38 tons full load
Dimensions: 16 x 4.5 x 1.3 metres
Speed, Range: 10, 600 miles at 10 kts.
Crew: 9

Sensors:

Radars: navigation

Comments:

Can carry 340 tons of cargo.


AKAR CLASS

NUMBER NAME LAUNCHED COMMISSIONED
A-580 AKAR 17 Nov 1983 9 Sep 1987
A-595 YARBAY KUDRET GÜNGÖR 1994 23 May 1997

Characteristics:

Displacement: 19.350 tons full load
Dimensions: 145 x 22.8 x 8.4 metres
Speed, Range: 16 knots, 6000 miles at 14 kts.
Crew: 203 (14 officers)

Weapons:

Guns: 1 x 20mm Mk15 Phalanx; 2 x 40mm/70
Helicopters: Platform for one medium

Sensors:

Radars: SPG-34, fire control (A-580); Decca 1226, navigation

Comments:

A-580 carries: 16,000 tons fuel oil A-595 carries: 9,980 tons fuel oil, 2,700 tons water, 80 tons oil, 500m3 cargo. YARBAY KUDRET GÜNGÖR is the first ship ever build for the Turkish Navy by a private Turkish shipyard. She is named after the commander of the destroyer DM-357 TCG MUAVENET, killed by a Sea Sparrow fired from USS Saratoga


ALBAY HAKKI BURAK CLASS

NUMBER NAME LAUNCHED COMMISSIONED
A- 571 ALBAY HAKKI BURAK August 1999 21 Nov 1999
A-572 YÜBAŞI İHSAN TULUNAY 21 November 1999 16 Feb 2000

Characteristics:

Displacement: 3200 tons full load
Dimensions: 81.3 x 12.2 x 5 metres
Speed, Range: 15 knots
Crew: 64 (7 officers)

Weapons:

Guns: 2 x 12,7mm MG.

Sensors:

Radars: Navigation

Comments:

Can carry 1865 tons fuel oil; 225 ton water.  Built by the private RKM shipyard for the Turkish Navy. The contract was signed on 30 December 1997. Both ships have replaced older ships with the same names.


TRANSPORT SHIPS

NUMBER NAME COMMISSIONED
A-1600 İSKENDERUN 25 July 2002

Characteristics:

Displacement: 10.583 gross tons
Dimensions: 127.5 x 19.5 x 5.4 metres
Speed, Range:15.5 knots
Crew: 129 (11 officer)

Sensors:

Radars: Navigation

Comments:

Built in Istanbul Camialtı Shipyard for Turkish Maritime Lines. Identical to Polish built ferries Samsun and Ankara. Launched in 1987. Can carry 214 cars.


RHEIN CLASS

NUMBER NAME COMMISSIONED
A-577 SOKULLU MEHMET PAŞA (ex- Donau) 23 May 1995
A-579 CEZAYİRLİ GAZİ HASAN PAŞA (ex- Elbe) 31 March 1993

Characteristics:

Displacement: 2940 tons full load
Dimensions: 98.2 x 11.8 x 4.4 metres
Speed, Range: 20.5 knots, 1625 miles at 15 kts.
Crew: 188 (15 officers)

Weapons:

Guns: 2 x 100mm/55; 4 x 40mm/60

Sensors:

Radars: DA 02, surface search; M 45, fire control

Comments:

Elbe replaced ex-Ruhr with the same name and number and Donau replaced ex-Isar with the same name and number. Both are used as training ships for cadets.


TRAINING CRAFT

NUMBER NAME COMMISSIONED
A-1531 E-1 2 April 2000
A-1532 E-2 2 April 2000
A-1533 E-3 2 April 2000
A-1534 E-4 2 April 2000
A-1535 E-5 2 April 2000
A-1536 E-6 2 April 2000
A-1537 E-7 2 April 2000
A-1538 E-8 2 April 2000

Characteristics:

Dispalcement: 97 tons full loaded
Dimensions: 28.6 x 6 x 1.4 metres
Speed, Range: 12 kts., 240 miles
Crew: 10 (1 officer) + 10 ratings

Sensors:

Radars: Navigation

Comments:

Built by the private Bora shipyard. They are used for seamanship training of the Naval Academy cadets.


DIVER CLASS

NUMBER NAME COMMISSIONED
A-589 IŞIN 28 Oct. 1979

Characteristics:

Displacement: 1970 tons full load
Dimensions: 65.08 x 12.5 x 4 metres
Speed, Range: 15 knots
Crew: 110 (9 officers)

Weapons:

Guns:2 x 20mm

Sensors:

Radars: Navigation

Comments:

Leased in 1979 and purchesed in 1987. Used as salvage ship.


BLUEBIRD CLASS

NUMBER NAME COMMISSIONED
A-584 KURTARAN 25 August 1950

Characteristics:

Displacement: 1760 tons full load
Dimensions: 62.5 x 12.2 x 4.88 metres
Speed, Range: 16 knots
Crew: 100 (9 officers

Weapons:

Guns:1 x 76mm; 2 x 20mm

Sensors:

Radars: Navigation

Comments:

Converterted tug. Used as a submarine rescue ship. Carries a diving bell and other equipment


CHANTICLEER CLASS

NUMBER NAME COMMISSIONED
A-585 AKIN 23 December 1970

Characteristics:

Displacement: 2321 tons full load
Dimensions: 76.7 x 13 x 4.5 metres
Speed, Range: 15 knots
Crew: 111(9 officers)

Weapons:

Guns: 1 x 40mm 4 x 20mm

Sensors:

Radars: Navigation

Comments:

Submarine rescue ship. Carries a diving bell and other equipment.


DARICA CLASS

NUMBER NAME LAUNCHED COMMISSIONED
A-578 DARICA 27 July 1987 13 June 1991

Characteristics:

Displacement: 750 tons , full load
Dimensions: 41 x 9.8 x 4 metres
Speed, Range: 15 knots, 2,500 at 14 kts.
Crew: 27 (3 officers)

Sensors:

Radars: Navigation

Comments:

Built at Taşkızak Naval Yard. Has firefighting and torpedo tendering capabilites.


TENACE CLASS

NUMBER NAME LAUNCHED COMMISSIONED
A-576 DEĞİRMENDERE 14 May 1974 22 July 1999

Characteristics:

Displacement: 1580 tons, full load
Dimensions: 51 x 11.6 x 5.7 metres
Speed, Range: 15 kts.; 9,500 at 13 kts.
Crew: 37 (3 officers)

Sensors:

Radars: Navigation

Comments:

Purchased from French Navy in 1999. She is a ocean going tug but has firefighting capabiliy too.
Old name: Centaure


CHEROKEE CLASS

NUMBER NAME LAUNCHED COMMISSIONED
A-587 GAZAL 1942 9 March 1973

Characteristics:

Displacement: 1675 tons full load
Dimensions: 62.5 x 11.5 x 5.2 metres
Speed, Range: 16,
Crew: 85 (9 officers)

Weapons:

Guns: 1 x 76mm; 2 x 20mm

Sensors:

Radars: Navigation

Comments:

Transferred from USN on 9 March 1973. Purchased on 15 August 1973. Near sister to submarine salvage ship TCG KURTARAN.

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